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Part of the Universal Periodic Review Process (UPR) at the UN Human Rights Council involves the 
states, who are conducting the review, issuing recommendations to the state that is under review. 
These recommendations can be on a range of issues surrounding the protection of human rights, from 
simple praise of a state to a recommendation that a state becomes party to a human rights treaty. 
States are free to reject or accept recommendations and each year several thousand recommendations 
are made as part of the UPR process. This paper examines what legal status (if any) recommendations 
could have and how they relate to existing sources of international law. The first and second sections 
examine the nature of recommendations and the legal status of the UPR process. The third and fourth 
sections examine how accepted patterns of recommendations could be used as a mechanism for 
interpreting and enforcing existing norms in international human rights law.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This project began with me correcting the law on a social media post. The article that had gone viral 
was a report headlined ‘Saudi Arabia criticises Norway over human rights record’ with the article 
reporting that Norway was being scrutinised by Saudi Arabia over its protection of women’s rights 
and Saudi Arabia was recommending that ‘criticism of religion and of prophet Mohammed be made 
illegal’.1 The misapprehension created by this article—which resulted in a flurry of shares on social 
media—was that Saudi Arabia was somehow putting Norway on trial at the UN over its human rights 
record. In fact, what was happening was that Norway was undergoing its second cycle of Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR) at the UN Human Rights Council (HRC). The Saudi recommendation was 
one of many that Norway had received during its review which Norway had ‘noted’ (UPR 
terminology for rejection).  This was all part of the system that had successfully reviewed the human 
rights record of all countries at the UN, ensuring participation from countries traditionally hostile to 
international human rights organisations, such as Israel and Cuba, because it gave notional parity to 
all states. Recommendations are made to states under review by the states conducting the review.
2
 
They are meant to be political and are not akin to other aspects of international human rights law, such 
as comments by human rights treaty bodies, which are intended to have some form of legal status. 
This was what I explained at some length on social media, to debunk the assumptions surrounding the 
Saudi Arabia-Norway misunderstanding. Over 5,000 recommendations are issued through the UPR 
                                                          
1  Felicity Morse, ‘Saudi Arabia criticises Norway over human rights record’ The Independent (29 April 2014)  
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/saudi-arabia-criticises-norway-over-human-rights-record-9301796.html> accessed 13 
March 2018. 
2  United Nations Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Basic facts about the UPR’, 24 May 2017  
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/BasicFacts.aspx> accessed 13 March 2018. 
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process each year; many of them are relatively uncontroversial, whereas others try to make states alter 
their behaviour or comply with an existing legal obligation.
3
 
 
This raises a broader question—can UPR recommendations have a legal status? This article is an 
attempt to provide an answer to that question. Several writers have already examined the UPR’s work 
in shaping human rights norms through deliberation and the dialogic process of review—engaging in 
interactive dialogue with states to work towards improving their human rights record.
4
 Yet, that does 
not necessarily mean that recommendations have a legal status. On its website, the Office of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights makes no reference to recommendations having any sort of legal 
status.
5
 Some of the literature on this issue treats recommendations as a series of political 
commitments rather than as indicative of any legal obligation or effect.
6
 Yet, recommendations issued 
and accepted by states under review have overlapped with existing legal commitments. A series of 
recommendations have been issued on the interpretation of a particular set of rights, or in relation to 
particular practices, which could indicate the creation of an emerging international consensus on a 
particular issue. The UPR process has also encouraged compliance with existing obligations upon 
states.  
 
The question of whether recommendations have a legal status relates to a broader discussion of what 
the exact role of the UPR process is within international law. Formalist accounts of the origins of 
international law rely heavily on the ‘sources thesis’—the idea that a piece of law must originate from 
a recognised source of international law to be recognised as law.
7
 Yet, this relies on a hard distinction 
being drawn between political and legal institutions and discounts the way that the authority of 
international organisations can evolve. Formalist accounts of the UPR process categorise it as a 
political process as it was created by a General Assembly Resolution and reviews are conducted by 
states acting as peers rather than human rights experts or judges examining cases.
8
 For example, a 
Brookings Institute/Open Society Justice Initiative paper described the UPR as ‘a valuable political 
process’ and distinguished it from other processes at the HRC and the work of treaty bodies.9 Another 
way of describing the UPR process is as a form of soft law in that it is not binding on states. In so far 
as it has an impact on state behaviour this is by virtue of its political function. However, drawing a 
strict distinction between soft and hard law is unhelpful because, as Kal Raustiala notes, there is little 
basis in ‘state practice or legal theory’ for such a sharp distinction.10 As this paper notes, in some 
                                                          
3
 Statistics taken from UPR Info ‘Statistics of Recomendations’ (UPR Info 1 March 2018) <https://www.upr-
info.org/database/index.php?limit=0&f_SUR=46&f_SMR=All&order=&orderDir=ASC&orderP=true&f_Issue=All&search
Reco=&resultMax=25&response=&action_type=&session=&SuRRgrp=&SuROrg=&SMRRgrp=&SMROrg=&pledges=Re
coOnly> accessed 2 March 2018. 
4  See for example Karolina Milewicz and Robert Goodin, ‘Deliberative Capacity Building through International 
Organizations: The Case of the Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights’ (2016) 46 British Journal of Political Science 
1; Rhona Smith, ‘Pacific Island States: Themes Emerging from the United Nations Human Rights Council's Inaugural 
Universal Periodic Review’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 569; Edward McMahon and Marta Ascherio, 
‘A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights? The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council’ (2012) 18 
Global Governance 231. 
5 UNHRC website (n 2). 
6 See for example Alex Conte, ‘Reflections and Challenges: Entering into the Second Cycle of the Universal Periodic 
Review Mechanism’ (2011) 9 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 187. 
7 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (OUP, Oxford 2014) 10–11. 
8  See for example Purna Sen, Monica Vincent and Jade Cochran, Universal Periodic Review: Lessons, Hopes and 
Expectations (Commonwealth Secretariat 2011) 7. 
9 Brookings OSJI, ‘Improving Implementation and Follow up Treaty Bodies, Special Procedures and Universal Periodic 
Review’ Report of Proceedings 22–23 November 2010 
<https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/improving-implementation-20110307.pdf> accessed 13 March 
2018.  
10  Kal Raustiala, ‘Form and Substance in International Agreements’ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 581, 
582.  
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circumstances states alter their behaviour in response to soft law from international organisations. 
Constructivist theory maintains that the behaviour of actors within international organisations is 
shaped by past practices and the social climate created by those organisations.
11
 Recent constructivist 
scholarship has highlighted how the socialisation of states can protect human rights and encourage 
compliance with international law.
12
 UPR recommendations come in different forms and states under 
review are at liberty to accept or reject recommendations, yet there is a category of recommendations 
that, by their framing, are designed to influence state behaviour.  
 
This article argues that in specific circumstances, these recommendations have a legal status. This 
occurs in two ways; firstly some recommendations by their subject matter are indicative of an 
emerging consensus in international human rights law in relation to the scope and application of a 
particular right. Secondly other accepted recommendations deal with rights already protected by 
existing human rights treaties with the recommendation complementing or even completing the 
process of enforcing the obligation on a state to protect that right.  Whether this has an impact on the 
ground is beyond the scope of this article. However, by accepting particular recommendations states 
are demonstrating on the international plane that they are willing to alter their human rights practices 
and laws. The first section of this article examines the process of issuing UPR recommendations 
within the context of the review process. Although the UPR has a role in encouraging compliance 
with international human rights law, as the second section argues this does not mean that it is engaged 
in law-making. However, as outlined in the third and fourth section, a series of UPR 
recommendations could be evidence of emerging opinio juris and some individual UPR 
recommendations operate in a manner that enhances the organisational capacity of the UPR process to 
act as an enforcement mechanism. What has been happening is that the nature of the UPR has been 
evolving over successive review cycles leading in turn to the evolution of the status of 
recommendations. 
2 AN OVERVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE UPR PROCESS  
Recommendations are issued to the state under review during the interactive discussion stage of their 
review.  This takes place after the state under review has had its documentary evidence reviewed and 
engaged in the interactive dialogue with the review panel.
13
 By the time a state is offered a 
recommendation they have had their country report, stakeholder reports and any treaty body reports 
scrutinised. Because of the different nature of recommendations offered by states, some of which 
relate to serious human rights abuses others of which amount to little more than compliments of the 
state under review, Edward McMahon has developed a system for classifying recommendations based 
on their linguistic construction and the nature of the action they involve.
14
  Recommendations 
classified as category one are aimed at requesting information from the state under review; whilst 
recommendations classified as category two are aimed at emphasising continuity or continuation of 
practice. It is the latter category where ‘praise bargaining’—the issuing of recommendations 
unconditionally praising the state under review in the hope that process is reciprocated when they are 
under review—takes place.15 Around a third of all recommendations require specific action, which are 
                                                          
11 Ian Hurd, International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice (3rd edn, CUP Cambridge 2017) 26–27. 
12 Elizabeth Stubbins Bates, ‘Sophisticated Constructivism in Human Rights Compliance Theory’ (2014) 25 European 
Journal of International Law 1169; Ryan Goodman and David Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through 
International Law (OUP, Oxford 2013) 20–35. 
13 UNHRC website (n 2). 
14  Edward McMahon, ‘Action Category’ (UPR Info, October 2014) <https://www.upr-
info.org/database/files/Database_Action_Category.pdf> accessed 1 June 2017.  
15 Ibid. The term ‘praise bargaining’ is used in Allehone Abebe, ‘Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the 
Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 1, 22.   
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classed as category five. These recommendations involve legal verbs such as ‘abolish, accede, adopt, 
amend, implement, enforce [and] ratify’.16 
 
The final UPR report details the recommendations accepted by the state under review and records 
recommendations that the state party refuses to accept or makes no comment upon. There is a further 
option to give a general or a specific response to the recommendations received and to give a general 
response about how the state views the subject matter of any specific recommendation.  A state cannot 
technically reject a recommendation. Instead recommendations are marked as ‘noted’ where a state 
has signalled that a recommendation ‘does not enjoy its support’ or that it ‘does not accept’ the 
recommendation.
17
 In practice this still results in recommendations being rejected by states but allows 
such matters to come up again in subsequent review cycles. During the first review cycle, between 
2008 and 2011, over 20,000 recommendations were made and nearly 70% were accepted.
18
  Around 
50% of all recommendations concerned the signature, ratification and implementation of international 
instruments; other recommendations often focused on specific practices such as torture or the 
country’s justice system.19 After the first year there was an increase in the number of states signing up 
to major human rights treaties. Whilst there was not a demonstrative causal link between the two, this 
phenomenon was a sign that there was a positive association between UPR recommendations and the 
improvement of human rights protection.
20
 Yet it is also worth noting that the majority of rejected 
recommendations were category 5 recommendations – in the first cycle around 60% were rejected.21 
Data from the second review cycle shows that 47% of all category 5 recommendations were 
rejected.
22
 This indicates a reasonably high correlation between rejection and legal language within 
the recommendation in question. Even though factors such as the region of the State under Review 
and the substantive human rights issue involved in the recommendation have an impact on whether or 
not a state accepts the reservation, there are far more rejections of category 5 recommendations than 
any other category of recommendation.
23
 This article focuses principally on category 5 
recommendations because that class of recommendation contains the majority of recommendations 
using language conveying a definitive obligation upon states to act in a particular way, linguistically 
resembling other provisions in international law containing legal obligations, such as the articles of a 
treaty. 
 
The nature of the UPR and its role was the subject of many disagreements during the HRC’s creation. 
Most states agreed on the idea of an objective, peer review mechanism along the lines of other peer 
review mechanisms such as the Development Assistance Committee peer review process of the 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17  UPR Info, ‘Methodology Responses to recommendations‘ (UPR Info, October 2014) <https://www.upr-
info.org/database/files/Database_Methodology_Responses_to_recommendations.pdf> accessed 1 June 2017.  
18 UNDP Moldova and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Draft Report, International Conference on 
Responding to the UPR Recommendations: Challenges, Innovation and Leadership, Chisinau’ (UN Development Program, 
4–5 November 2011) 4 
<http://www.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/DemGov/Draft_Responding%20to%20the%20UPR%20Recommendations_%2
0Challenges,%20Innovation%20and%20Leadership.pdf> accessed 1 June 2017.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Purna Sen, Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights: Towards Best Practice (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2009) 35–6. 
21 Edward McMahon, ‘The Universal Periodic Review: A Work in Progress: An Evaluation of the First Cycle of the New 
UPR Mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights Council’ (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Dialogue on Globalization, 
September 2012) 18. 
22 Unless stated otherwise all subsequent references to the number of recommendations made are drawn from the UPR Info 
Database of Recommendations <https://www.upr-
info.org/database/index.php?limit=0&f_SUR=46&f_SMR=All&order=&orderDir=ASC&orderP=true&f_Issue=All&search
Reco=&resultMax=25&response=&action_type=&session=&SuRRgrp=&SuROrg=&SMRRgrp=&SMROrg=&pledges=Re
coOnly> accessed 2 March 2018.   
23 Ibid. 
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
24
 Interestingly, the obligation of 
states to comply with the UPR process was never contested, even though regional peer-review 
mechanisms rely on state acceptance, and neither General Assembly Resolution 60/251 nor HRC 
Resolution 5/1—the constituent instruments of the Council—set out a procedure for states that refuse 
to engage in the UPR process.
25
  The process of recommendations needs to be seen in the context of 
the UPR’s dialogic approach. This approach is set out in Resolution 60/251 where the review is 
described as a ‘cooperative mechanism based on an interactive dialogue.26  Recommendations were 
envisaged as the conclusion of a dialogue between the state under review and the Council, rather than 
resolutions or declarations. HRC Resolution 5/1 instructs that a guiding principle of the UPR should 
be a ‘cooperative mechanism based on objective and reliable information and on interactive dialogue’ 
and it is in that context that the only reference to recommendations in Resolution 5/1 should be read.
27
 
There is also another dimension to recommendations: General Assembly Resolution 60/251 requires 
the UPR process to ‘complement and not duplicate the work of treaty bodies’.28 This can be read both 
as a prohibition on duplication, but also as a provision allowing the UPR to work in parallel with 
treaty bodies to enforce human rights obligations. Ibrahim Salama, the Director of Human Rights 
Treaties Division at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, argued in 2011 that 
in order to avoid duplication of UPR recommendations, we should focus on ‘mutually reinforcing’ the 
recommendations of treaty bodies rather than issuing fresh recommendations on the same subject 
matter.
29
  
 
Early accounts of the UPR focused heavily on the dialogic nature of the process, with relatively little 
reference to the legal status of recommendations.
30
 Christian Tomuschat observed that in the 
documents founding the UPR there was a clear difference between recommendations relating to the 
commitments that states had already made, which would be governed by pacta sunt servanda, and 
recommendations relating to novel or fresh commitments.
31
 In the first cycle there was some evidence 
that states recognised this distinction, but this did not stop the issuing of recommendations that went 
beyond the state under review’s existing commitments. For example, recommendations made in 
relation to LGBTQ+ rights often made reference to existing human rights commitments but 
occasionally referenced commitments that states had not made.
32
 However the language used to 
describe the UPR in both the General Assembly resolution creating the HRC and the HRC’s own 
institution-building resolution, involves terms such as ‘technical assistance’ and ‘policy advice’.33 
This would seem to indicate that the process of issuing recommendations is not a source of law but is 
in fact similar to decrees or declarations issued by other international governmental bodies, such as 
the World Health Organisation, which may create legal effects but are not generally considered a 
                                                          
24 Edward McMahon and Marta Ascherio, ‘A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights? The Universal Periodic Review of 
the UN Human Rights Council’ (2012) 18 Global Governance 231.  
25 Abebe (n 15), 3–4. 
26 UNGA Res 60/251 (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/251 para 5(e). 
27 UNHRC Res 5/1 (18 June 2007).  
28 UNGA Res 60/251 (n 26).  
29Ibrahim Salama, ‘Proliferation of Treaty Bodies or Expansion of Protection?’ (2011) 105 Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting: American Society of International Law 515, 519.  
30 For examples see Elvira Dominguez-Redondo ‘The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council: An 
Assessment of the First Session’ (2008) 7 Chinese Journal of International Law 721.  
31 Christian Tomuschat, ‘Universal Periodic Review: A New System of International Law with Specific Ground Rules?’  in 
Ulrich Fastenrath et al (eds), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (OUP, Oxford 
2011) 613. 
32 Frederick Cowell and Angelina Milon, ‘Decriminalisation of Sexual Orientation Through the Universal Periodic Review’ 
(2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 341, 344. 
33  Phillip Alston, ‘Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New UN Human Rights 
Council’ (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 185, 207. 
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source of law stricto sensu, but instead soft law.
34
 As Nadia Bernaz noted in an analysis of the legal 
status of the UPR in 2009—midway through the first review cycle—the different political 
considerations and sharp divergences of opinion among states over the role of treaty bodies and other 
existing human rights instruments, meant that it was difficult to appraise the process from a purely 
legal perspective.
35
 Bernaz noted that the chief problem with ascertaining the UPR’s legal status was 
that it treated binding and nonbinding norms equally for the purposes of conducting the review.
36
 
 
Yet in spite of this ambiguity, states act as though recommendations matter and have clear and 
definite consequences. One indication of this is the manner in which states often act as blocs, 
mirroring existing regional and political alignments in the General Assembly and support members of 
their own bloc when they are under review. As Adrienne Komanovics notes, the large number of 
friendly recommendations from states in the same regional bloc, which require very little action or are 
simply pieces of praise, take ‘time away from making valid criticism’ of the state under review.37 
Tunisia and Bahrain for example were able to mount what Gareth Sweeny and Yuri Saito described as 
‘an exercise in filibustering’ by only receiving questions praising their human rights records from the 
Africa and Asia blocs, despite both countries at the time of review being engaged in violent repression 
of their domestic political opponents.
38
 This is at least evidence of a desire to avoid negative 
consequences on the part of a state under review, indicating that the process as a whole is recognised 
as conveying some form of power. Other states, however, saw recommendations as a positive feature 
to emphasise their compliance with human rights commitments and used their UPR mid-term reports 
to summarise their progress towards implementing recommendations.
39
  
 
By the second cycle it was relatively clear that the UPR would play a quasi-scrutiny role in relation to 
previously issued recommendations. In 2011 the International Committee of Jurists issued calls for 
mechanisms to promote implementation of recommendations.
40
 During a review of UPR functions a 
proposal was considered which would have required the outcome report of a review to contain a 
timeframe for the implementation of recommendations, which if adopted would have provided a 
mechanism for monitoring the implementation of recommendations by a state.
41
 This would have 
created a normative expectation in favour of a recommendation’s implementation. However, these 
proposals were considered too far reaching and were not adopted; later in 2011 the Council adopted a 
decision requiring states under review to detail any domestic law reforms and accession to 
international treaties they had made when implementing recommendations.
42
 Although these reforms 
were described as ‘modest’ and chiefly resulting in ‘minor fixes or adjustments’ by some 
                                                          
34 Paul Szasz, ‘General Law Making Processes’ in Christopher C. Joyner (ed), The United Nations and International Law 
(CUP, Cambridge 1997) 27, 40–43.  
35 Nadia Bernaz, ‘Reforming the UN Human Rights Protection Procedures: A Legal Perspective on the Establishment of the 
Universal Periodic Review Mechanism’ in Kevin Boyle (ed), New Institutions for Human Rights Protection (OUP, Oxford 
2009) 75, 77.  
36 Ibid. 
37Adrienne Komanovics, ‘The Human Rights Council and the Universal Periodic Review: Is it More Than A Public 
Relations Exercise’ (2012) 150 Studia Iuridica Auctoritate Universitatis Pecs Publicata 119, 142. 
38Gareth Sweeny and Yuri Saito, ‘An NGO Assessment of the New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council’ (2009) 9 
Human Rights Law Review 203, 210. 
39 ISHR, ‘Council debate on UPR: raising the bar for the second cycle’ (International Service for Human Rights 26 March 
2012) < http://www.ishr.ch/news/council-debate-upr-raising-bar-second-cycle > accessed 1 September 2017.  
40 International Committee of Jurists, ‘Position Paper on the Review of the Human Rights Council’ (3 February 2011)  
<http://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/ICJ-humanrightscouncil-advocacy-2011.pdf > accessed 1 September 2017. 
41  Alex Conte, ‘Reflections and Challenges: Entering into the Second Cycle of the Universal Periodic Review 
Mechanism’(2011) 9 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 187. 
42 UNHRC Res 16/21 (12 April 2011) UN Doc HRC/RES/16/21; UNHRC Res 17/119 (19 July 2011) UN Doc 
HRC/DEC/17/119. 
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commentators,
 43
 they increased the dialogic capacity of the UPR process and the UPR’s capacity for 
norm promotion by allowing some review of the implementation of recommendations. These 
institutional reforms were however all explained in terms of enhancing the capacity and effectiveness 
of the UPR process, rather than in legal terms.  By the end of the second review cycle in 2016 some 
states clearly had changed their position in relation to the protection of human rights with the number 
of treaty ratifications increasing in part as a result of accepted recommendations. Almost 21,000 
category five recommendations have been made to date, most countries have accepted at least one of 
the recommendations made to them and only a handful of countries have yet to make any 
recommendation to a state under review.
44
 Recommendations are increasingly becoming a larger part 
of the overall review process with the number of recommendations increasing from the first to the 
second review cycle and likely to increase still further in the third. It is therefore reasonable to 
conclude that the UPR process was clearly designed to have some normative effect on state behaviour 
and recommendations are a crucial part of that function.  
3 UPR RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE SHAPING OF STATE BEHAVIOUR – 
ASSESSING THE REVIEW PROCESS AS A LAWMAKING PROCESS  
Having the capacity to shape state behaviour does not necessarily mean that an institution creates 
international law. There is some considerable scepticism amongst critics of ‘soft law’ that institutional 
declarations, commitments or recommendations can have any legal effect, with one critic describing 
them as ‘informal standard setting’.45  A rigidly formalist view such as this downplays the social way 
in which international actors react to recognised sources of authority and alter their behaviour.
46
 
Maintaining a sharp distinction between hard law, with the attendant qualities of its binding nature 
and precision, and soft law which is assumed to have none of those qualities, has come in for some 
criticism for engineering too binary a distinction between the two forms of law.
47
  Most forms of 
international law are ‘soft’ in that they require high levels of voluntary state compliance and 
acquiescence in their implementation and ‘hard’ in the sense that there are reputational consequences 
for a state that fails to comply, leading some scholars to argue that rather than seeing hard and soft 
law as binary choices it is better to see them as choices along a continuum that at its extreme has fixed 
definitions of hard and soft law.
48
 Constructivist scholarship has examined how socialising states 
within organisations makes them compliant with that organisation and can encourage a process of 
norm adherence generating a process of legalism where the organisation itself can be seen as a source 
of law.
49
 An interactional account of international law, advanced by Jutta Brunnée and Stephen 
Toope, looks at how legal commitments ‘arise in the context of social norms based on shared 
understandings’ and argues that commitment to norms is maintained through continuing practices.50 
The interaction created by a state-state peer review mechanism, such as the UPR, over time builds up 
the authority of the process and results in states progressively complying with recommendations. The 
issue of whether an organisation produces soft law or hard law is not particularly important under an 
                                                          
43 Edward McMahon, Kojo Busia and Marta Ascherio, ‘Comparing Peer Reviews: The Universal Periodic Review of the UN 
Human Rights Council and the African Peer Review Mechanism’ (2013) 12 African and Asian Studies 266, 268. 
44 UPR Info (n 22).  
45 Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Organizations Law (3rd edn, CUP Cambridge 2015) 157. 
46 Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law: a theory of the ascertainment of legal rules (OUP, 
Oxford 2011) ch 8. 
47  Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in 
International Governance’ (2009) 94 Minnesota Law Review 706, 713–714. 
48 Ibid 715, see also Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54 
International Organisation 421, 423. 
49 Bates (n 12). 
50  Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (CUP, 
Cambridge 2010) 15. 
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interactional account of the law because what matters is the legitimising or delegitimising effect that 
an organisation’s practice or declarations has on a state’s actions.51 As Brunnée and Toope argue an 
international account shows how international law creates ‘a feedback loop …whereby actors within 
global society can learn collectively to value the rule of law more highly’ but that this requires 
institutions and constant institutional practices.
52
 
 
Some international relations literature has discussed this in terms of institutional practices which can 
become authoritative as they define the parameters of state action leading to states altering their 
behaviour.
53
 For example, states sometimes follow initiatives and recommendations of the technical 
arm of the OECD and are prepared to accept interpretations of international law from debates in the 
UN Security Council, which are not binding on states but are considered authoritative.
54
 What is 
particularly important in these cases is the institutional setting within which recommendations are 
made.
55
  The dialogic nature of the review process is often commented upon in literature on the UPR 
when distinguishing it from the practices of the Council’s predecessor, the UN Commission on 
Human Rights.
56
 Jane Cowan’s description of the UPR process as an ‘audit ritual’ utilising overt 
pressure through ‘naming and shaming’ alongside other more co-operative mechanisms, such as 
offering technical support, captures how the UPR process attempts to have a normative effect on state 
behaviour.
57
   Ambassador Blaise Godet, former vice president of the Commission on Human Rights, 
believed that cooperation within the Council, or otherwise speaking about human rights abuses during 
UPR sessions, would help lead to changes that would assist human rights protection.
58
 An empirical 
analysis of recommendations showed that there is some evidence that states have been encouraged to 
accept resolutions relating to new human rights commitments.
59
 Another study of UPR 
recommendations made to the UK and India showed that there was evidence by the second cycle that 
both states were commenting on the implementation, or lack of implementation of particular 
recommendations made to them.
60
 
 
While this is evidence of state behaviour changing there is less evidence that states perceive 
recommendations to be part of a legal process creating obligations. A study of state behaviour at the 
end of the first cycle by Jane Cowan and Julie Billaud observed a number of comments about ‘good 
students setting an example’ and ‘bad kids playing games at the back of the class’ which they argued 
demonstrated that the UPR process was something akin to a ‘school exam’ for states. 61  The 
importance of the performative nature of the UPR process is a key part of Cowan’s analysis of the 
                                                          
51 Ibid.  
52 Brunnée and Toope ‘Interactional Legal Theory, the International Rule of Law and Global Constitutionalism’ in Anthony 
F. Lang and Antje Wiener (eds), Handbook on Global Constitutionalism (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2017) 174. 
53  Ian Johnston, ‘The Power Interpretive Communities’ in Barnett and Duvall (eds) Power in Global Governance (4th edn, 
CUP, Cambridge 2008) 185; Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Making Sense of “International Practices”’ in Adler and Pouliot (eds) 
International Practices (CUP, Cambridge 2011) 36. 
54 Johnston (n 52) 36. Andrew Hurrell, ‘Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality’ in Barnett and Duvall (n 52). 
55 More broadly outside the realm of UPR Recommendations, see Brunnée and Toope (n 49) 64–65.  
56  See Jarvis Matiya, ‘Repositioning the International Human Rights Protection System: The UN Human Rights Council’ 
(2010) 36 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 313, 313, 319; Matthew Davies, ‘Rhetorical Inaction? Compliance and the Human 
Rights Council of the United Nations’ (2010) 35 Alternatives 449, 457. 
57 Jane Cowan, ‘The Universal Periodic Review as Public Audit Ritual: An Anthropological Perspective on Emerging 
Practices in the Global Governance of Human Rights’ in Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking (eds), Human Rights and 
the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism (CUP, Cambridge 2015) 42–44. 
58 Blaise Godet, ‘Reforming Human Rights’ (2008) 29 Harvard International Review 74, 74–75. 
59  Milewicz and Goodin (n 3).  
60 Emma Hickey, ‘The UN’s Universal Periodic Review: Is it Adding Value and Improving the Human Rights Situation on 
the Ground?’ (2013) 7 International Constitutional Law Journal 1.   
61 Jane Cowan and Julie Billaud, ‘Between Learning and Schooling: The Politics of Human Rights Monitoring at the 
Universal Periodic Review’ (2015) 36 Third World Quarterly 1175, 1177. 
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UPR as an ‘audit ritual’ and she notes that the repetitiveness and publicity of the process underpinned 
its effectiveness.
62
 The high numbers of ‘friendly’ recommendations, with some states being issued a 
multiplicity of recommendations and others receiving recommendations echoing political praise, 
seems to further support the process of this being a ritualised or a performative process.
63
 Thus whilst 
the institutional framework of the UPR has normative effects in the way it encourages states to adopt 
new political and legal commitments, it is unclear that states perceive this process as an international 
law-making process in the same way that they would when voting in an international body. By way of 
illustration, theories on the legality of General Assembly resolutions have pointed to the role 
resolutions have in articulating an international legal consensus or representing the interests of a 
group of states, which is all indicative of the distillation and harmonisation of international opinion.
64
 
However recommendations are offered and accepted on an individual basis and it is not at all clear 
that this resembles the sort of consensus established by votes for a General Assembly resolution.  
 
It is also not clear that accepting a recommendation has any formal status. Although consent is a 
crucial feature for the creation of obligations in international treaty law, consent by itself is too narrow 
a metric to establish whether a state party has accepted the creation of legal obligations.
65
 As Basak 
Çali argues it makes sense to see consent in the context of the content of the obligation that an 
instrument seeks to impose upon states.
66
 In both the General Assembly resolution creating the HRC 
and the HRC resolution creating the UPR process, recommendations are treated alongside formal 
pledges and other declarations that a state under review may make.
67
  This context makes it unlikely 
that acceptance of an individual recommendation would carry any legal consequences, beyond an 
expression of a state’s individual intention. The acceptance of a recommendation to alter a state’s 
position in relation to a treaty obligation would be unlikely to be regarded as an individual declaration 
under the treaty as the acceptance of the recommendation creates a commitment from the state to the 
UPR process itself.  Acceptance of a recommendation allows the UPR process to scrutinise a state’s 
adherence to that recommendation in the next review cycle, so the status of a resolution is chiefly 
relevant to the administration of the UPR process in relation to the state under review.
68
  
 
Yet this is where a state’s acceptance of a recommendation may be significant as the capacity of the 
UPR in subsequent review cycles to follow up the implementation of that recommendation means that 
its acceptance leads to future scrutiny of the state on the subject matter of that recommendation. 
Where the recommendation in question relates to an existing legal obligation this effectively means 
that the state is committing to a scrutiny regime of that obligation. An accepted recommendation may 
also be similar to other recommendations accepted by other states. In this context they may be 
indicative of an emerging consensus on a matter of human rights protection. For the aforementioned 
reasons, it is difficult to conclude that recommendations have a legal status simply by virtue of being 
accepted by a state. Yet the impact they can have on altering state behaviour can relate to existing 
processes of law creation and enforcement in international law meaning that recommendations could, 
                                                          
62 Cowan (n 57) 45. 
63 The US, for example, received a high number of recommendations, whereas China received mostly praise-bargained 
recommendations. Rhona Smith, ‘The Five Permanent Members of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council's 
Universal Periodic Review’ (2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 1.  
64 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The United Nations at 70 Years: The Impact Upon International Law’ (2016) 65 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1. 
65 This view is set out by Fernando Tesón, ‘International Obligation and the Theory of Hypothetical Consent’ (1990) 15 Yale 
International Law Journal 84. 
66 Başak Çali, The Authority of International Law (OUP, Oxford 2015) 24 and 70. 
67 Higgins (n 63); see generally Richard Falk, ‘On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly’ (1966) 60 
American Journal of International Law 782, 788. 
68 Redondo (n 30). 
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in certain circumstances, have legal status. As the next two sections argue with reference to specific 
recommendations or a series of recommendations on a particular issue, there is a case for 
recommendations either being evidence of the expansion of existing legal norms or instrumental in 
enforcing existing norms. This means that recommendations whilst not emerging from a legal process 
can in certain circumstances have a legal status.   
4 RECOMMENDATIONS AS EVIDENCE OF OPINIO JURIS  
A pattern of accepted recommendations can in some circumstances highlight the emergence of a 
consensus on the scope or application of an already widely acknowledged right. Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties contains a number of different factors, such as subsequent 
practice and subsequent agreements between state parties, which can be used for the interpretation of 
a treaty provision.
69
 The meaning and scope of rights can evolve over time and recommendations 
being offered and accepted by states on a particular right, is evidence of what states collectively may 
think of the scope of a particular right and what practices it prohibits or encompasses.  For example 
the corporal punishment of children by state officials or teachers has been held by some international 
human rights bodies to be a form of inhuman and degrading treatment, although this is far from 
universal and some states continue to use corporal punishment.
70
 In the first UPR cycle, the 
recommendations referencing inhuman and degrading treatment, and recommendations concerning 
corporal punishment amounted to 11% of all accepted recommendations and 14% of all rejected 
recommendations. In the second cycle, such recommendations amounted to 13% of all accepted 
recommendations and just over 10% of all rejected recommendations, showing a slight increase in 
acceptance of recommendations concerning corporal punishment of children. Of all the 
recommendations across both cycles on the prohibition of the corporal punishment of children, 54% 
have been accepted.
71
 This does not mean that a new right is being created by the recommendations or 
that recommendations are the sole source of the prohibition on this practice. Rather, what is 
happening here is that an emerging trend of accepted recommendations can be viewed as evidence of 
a new interpretive norm that the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment should encompass 
the prohibition on corporal punishment.  
 
In generally considered necessary, as a matter of customary international law, to show both the 
emergence of a state practice and also the presence of opinio juris, establishing the existence of an 
obligation, which makes that practice, have legal consequences.
72
 Oscar Schachter attempted to 
formulate a theory of the origins of international legal obligations without focusing on their source or 
the consent of states to the norm.
73
 Schachter noted that some ICJ judgments inferred the existence of 
legal obligations using terms such as the ‘will of the community’ or ‘humanitarian duty’.74 From this 
he identified five processes for the establishment of obligatory norms: designation of state behaviour 
by a norm, the actor issuing the norm is viewed as competent, willingness to make a norm effective, 
transmittal of norms and the designation of a target audience for said norms.
75
 Critics have noted that 
while this theory explains how norms can be generated it does not explain how compliance with the 
                                                          
69 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 
(VCLT) art 31(3).  
70 See for example the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Tyrer v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 232. 
71 Data taken from UPR Info (n 22). 
72 Anthony D’Amato, ‘Trashing Customary International Law’ (1987) 81 American Journal of International Law 101.  
73 Oscar Schachter ‘Towards a Theory of International Obligation’ (1968) 8 Virginia Journal of International Law 300. 
74 Ibid 304. Illustrative cases on this point cited by Schachter include Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United 
Nations [1962] ICJ Rep 151; Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case [1950] ICJ Rep 266. 
75 Schachter (n 73) 312.  
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subsequent obligation within those norms is achieved.
76
 Yet the existence of an obligation should be 
distinguished from compliance with that obligation, as an obligation’s existence is the reason for 
compliance in the first place,
 77
 so the latter logically precedes the former. Given that the HRC created 
the UPR as a mechanism for promoting human rights, the process of states issuing recommendations 
is suggestive that a particular practice ought to be adopted by the state under review. Patterns of 
accepted UPR recommendations, of the sort described above, would be broadly compatible with 
Schachter’s criterion.  
 
The next element in establishing the existence of a new norm would be to see if there is a discernible 
pattern within the framing of accepted recommendations. The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons noted that General Assembly Resolutions may have normative value when a ‘series of 
resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new 
rule’.78  An obvious example of this is the norm of anti-colonial self-determination contained in 
General Assembly Resolution 1514 of December 1960 which in the decade after its adoption was 
cited 95 times in other resolutions.
79
 By the 1980s, it was clear that there was a recognised right to 
anti-colonial self-determination in international law.
80
 Whilst UPR recommendations are considerably 
different to General Assembly Resolutions, it is conceivable that a line of accepted recommendations 
could be indicative of a new norm if one takes Michael Byers’ view that ‘opinio juris itself represents 
a diffuse consensus a general set of shared understandings among states as to the “legal relevance” of 
particular kinds of behaviour’.81  Other scholarship on the origins of customary international norms 
has focused on the existence of a pattern or type of behaviour being observable as being the crucial 
determinate as to whether a norm might obtain the status of customary law.
82
   
 
The study of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the Identification of Customary 
International Law adopted a set of draft conclusions on the identification of customary international 
law in 2016 that was meant to provide a set of guidelines for practitioners to ensure the proper 
identification of customary rules.
83
 Draft Conclusion 4 refers specifically to ‘the practice of States’ as 
the primary factor for the ‘formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law’.84 The 
meaning of practice is clarified in Draft Conclusion 6 which states that practice includes a ‘wide range 
of forms’ including, but crucially not limited to, ‘resolutions adopted by an international organization 
or at an intergovernmental conference; conduct in connection with treaties; executive conduct’.85 
Although the status of recommendations is unclear, the open-ended nature of practice in Draft 
Conclusion 6 and other elements of the Draft Conclusions would seem to indicate that they are 
                                                          
76 See Oona Hathaway, ‘Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law’ (2005) 72 University of 
Chicago Law Review 469, 487. 
77 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Politics and International Legal Obligation’ (2003) 4 European Journal of International Relations 
591, 595. 
78 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons [1996] ICJ Rep 226 [70]. 
79 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples GA Res 1514 (XV) 15th Session (14 
December 1960). See also Samuel Bleicher, ‘The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of General Assembly Resolutions’ 
(1969) 63 American Journal of International Law 444.  
80 Christopher Joyner, ‘UN General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the Contemporary Dynamics 
of Norm-Creation’ (1981) 11 California Western International Law Journal 445, 465. 
81 Michael Byers, Custom Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law (CUP, 
Cambridge 1999) 18. 
82 For indicative examples of this literature see Niels Petersen, ‘Customary Law without Custom-Rules, Principles, and the 
Role of State Practice in International Norm Creation’ (2007) 23 American University International Law Review 275. For a 
more sceptical discussion see Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary 
International Law and Some of Its Problems’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 523. 
83 International Law Commission, ‘Identification of Customary International Law’ (30 May 2016) UN doc A/CN.4/L.872. 
84 Ibid. Draft Conclusion 4. 
85 Ibid. Draft Conclusion 6. 
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reflective of the sort of state practice that could constitute custom.
86
 As Jordan Paust argues, the use of 
custom in the protection of human rights can help establish which  practices fall within the scope of 
particular rights and help with the interconnection of ‘international law more generally and…domestic 
legal processes throughout the globe’.87 A pattern of accepted recommendations would represent the 
acceptance of a particular practice by states in the interpretation of a particular right. This would 
resolve one of the problems in the construction of customary human rights norms identified by Paust, 
namely that it is difficult to objectively measure patterns of the spread of a particular norm and how 
‘intensely held or demanded a particular norm is … among the international community’.88 Across 
both the first and second UPR review cycles a majority of category five recommendations requiring a 
prohibition of corporal punishment, on the grounds that it represents a form of inhuman and degrading 
treatment, have been accepted. It is therefore arguable that this line of accepted recommendations on 
corporal punishment is an example of norm evolution at work as an increasing number of states are 
willing to accept that corporal punishment can be considered inhuman and degrading treatment. 
Although no tribunal has yet referred to UPR recommendations in the process of interpreting rights, 
accepted patterns of recommendations could, as argued above, fall within the scope of materials used 
by tribunals to interpret rights as they are directly analogous to other interpretative or indicative 
material.  
 
Yet recommendations on this issue show some signs of divergence in their development. For instance, 
some recommendations, such as Latvia’s recommendation to the Maldives, which was rejected and 
focused on judicially administered punishment such as ‘flogging’ alongside ‘all forms of corporal 
punishment’ with an emphasis on controlling the role of state or public actors in the criminal justice 
system or in schools.
89
 Other rejected recommendations aimed to tackle corporal punishment in the 
home, or required the state to criminalise parents for administering physical chastisement to their 
children. For example Spain’s recommendation to Italy stated that corporal punishment was ‘not a 
legitimate method of discipline in the home’ and called for the Italian government to ‘criminalize 
corporal punishment in all cases, including in education’.90 This goes much further in scope that the 
recommendation directed at the Maldives as in order for its contents to be realised it would require the 
imposition of far reaching positive obligations on the state, such as the introduction of potentially 
complex legal frameworks criminalising parents in private spaces. In fact Barbados, Belgium and 
Canada have all rejected recommendations that convey some form of requirement to adopt far 
reaching laws on the criminalisation of corporal punishment that could involve criminal legislation of 
the private sphere.
91
 This would make the scope of any such prohibition quite limited and even then 
not all recommendations are specific about what exact actions a state is required to take. For example, 
                                                          
86  Whilst indicative of the sort of practice that would constitute custom, it is noteworthy that the ILC’s Draft 
Recommendations have come in for some criticism for the relatively broad scope of practice covered in the Draft 
Recommendations. See Rossana Deplano, ‘Assessing the Role of Resolutions in the ILC Draft Conclusions on Identification 
of Customary International Law’ (2017) 14 International Organizations Law Review 227.  
87 Jordan Paust, ‘The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of Customary Human Rights’ (1995) 25 Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 147, 147. 
88 Ibid 151. 
89  UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Maldives’ (13 July 2015) UN Doc 
A/HRC/30/8 at 144.37. 
90 This recommendation was rejected by Italy. UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: 
Italy’ (18 March 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/4 at 84.38. 
91  See for example Iceland’s recommendation to Canada required it to ‘Explicitly criminalize corporal punishment of 
children’. UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Canada’ (28 June 2013) UN Doc 
A/HRC/24/11 at 128.118. For Belgium UNHCR ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Belgium’ 
For Barbados UNHCR ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Barbados’ (12 March 2013) UN 
Doc A/HRC/23/11 at 102.82. For Belgium UNHCR ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: 
Belgium’(11 July 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/18/3 at 103.10.  
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Portugal’s recommendation to Ghana in the second cycle, which was accepted, stated that Ghana 
should ‘prohibit all forms of corporal punishment’ without specifying what exactly it ought to do.92 
 
This can also be seen in the parallel trend of recommendations aimed at harmonising international 
standards. By way of example, the legal age of consent for marriage is not defined in the Convention 
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) although there has been 
a concerted attempt by some activists and state parties to try to set an international minimum standard, 
which has led to General Recommendations on the issue from the CEDAW Committee and the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child.
93
 Across both the first and second UPR review cycles there 
were 70 accepted recommendations on increasing the age of marriage or calling for the prohibition of 
early marriage. However, many of these were framed in ambiguous terms and were unclear about the 
expected scope of state action, with less than a third of them actually specifying a minimum age for 
marriage or referring to existing international standards. Due to the divergent ways in which 
recommendations are framed—in part a consequence of their formulation individually by states – any 
norm arising from an accepted series of recommendations is likely to be limited in nature. For 
example it is reasonable to conclude from the pattern of accepted and rejected recommendations that 
whilst there is an emerging consensus that the state administration of punitive corporal punishment on 
children is inhuman and degrading treatment, it is far from clear that the same applies to corporal 
punishment administered by parents to infants or other forms of punishment in the home.  
 
This discussion also highlights one important difference between General Assembly Resolutions and 
UPR recommendations as a potential source of opinio juris. General Assembly Resolutions are 
communally drafted, amended and voted upon so that when a Resolution is passed its final text is a 
reflection of an authoritative international consensus on a particular issue. Recommendations are 
drafted and issued by states acting individually, rather than in concert, and are issued by 
representatives when it reflects the interests of the issuing state. Given the wide variance of wording it 
is difficult to identify any one recommendation as the definitive source of a norm, in the way that it is 
with General Assembly Resolutions, such as was the case with Resolution 1514 on decolonisation. 
Instead it is only possible to identify a series of recommendations with a strongly similar subject 
matter as indicative of a general trend that could constitute opinio juris. Realist critics have argued 
that rather than heralding the emergence of any special rule in international law, opinio juris is simply 
a reflection of confluence of various state interests, with each individual state having its own reasons 
for acting in that way independent of any specific legal obligation.
94
 This could well apply to the 
acceptance of recommendations as the motivations for states accepting and rejecting them has varied 
considerably. However, the argument advanced here is slightly different – the acceptance of 
recommendations could be indicative of how a particular right ought to be interpreted in relation to 
specific practices and rather than creating a right, custom shapes the scope of a widely acknowledged 
existing commitment.
95
 This is similar to the recommendations issued about the decriminalisation of 
homosexuality, which drew on states’ existing commitments to the protection of privacy and equality 
                                                          
92 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Ghana’ (13 December 2012) A/HRC/22/6 at 
125.50.  
93 See Equality Now, ‘UN CEDAW and CRC Recommendations on Minimum age of Marriage Laws around the World as of 
November 2013’ (Equality Now, 30 November 2013) 
<https://www.equalitynow.org/sites/default/files/UN_Committee_Recommendations_on_Minimum_Age_of_Marriage_Law
s.pdf> accessed 1 September 2017.   
94 See Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, ‘Understanding the Resemblance between Modern and Traditional Customary 
International Law’ (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 639, 661.  
95 See Paust (n 86); see also Detlev Vagts, ‘International Relations Looks at Customary International Law: A Traditionalist’s 
Defence’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 1031. 
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before the law to recommend the inclusion of a particular practice within their scope.
96
 As Bernaz 
noted, the targeted use of recommendations in the UPR process could assist with the ‘crystallization’ 
of customary international rules and, as the third review cycle progresses, it may well be possible to 
see further evidence of interpretive trends emerging in accepted recommendations.
97
  
5 RECOMMENDATIONS AS A COLLATERAL ENFORCEMENT MEASURE  
Some recommendations aim at enforcing an existing obligation, which the state under review is not 
complying with or not fulfilling. This potentially reinforces or duplicates an obligation contained in 
another legal instrument. A clear example of this principle are the reservations entered by state parties 
to CEDAW which has had a number of impermissible reservations entered by state parties, most 
notably to article 2 which requires state parties to condemn discrimination and adopt legislative and 
policy measures to combat discrimination. For example, Bangladesh entered a reservation stating that 
it ‘does not consider as binding upon itself the provisions of article 2, as they conflict with sharia law 
based on [the] Holy Koran and Sunna’, which is so far-reaching as to potentially invalidate the entire 
treaty.
98
 The CEDAW committee has decided that overly broad reservations are impermissible and 
has repeatedly asked states to withdraw reservations such as these with varying degrees of success.
99
 
The inadequacy of the reservations regime under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as it 
currently exists in relation to multilateral human rights treaties has been extensively highlighted in the 
literature as a weakness of the entire system of multilateral human rights treaties.
100
 One key problem 
is that beyond treaty bodies there is no regime or process for responding to impermissible reservations 
which has encouraged the issuing of reservations undermining the purpose of human rights treaties.
101
  
 
UPR recommendations have been issued to some states with impermissible reservations 
recommending the reservation be withdrawn. In the first UPR cycle the UK, Brazil, Italy and Sweden 
all issued recommendations stating that Oman should remove its reservations to CEDAW.
102
 Oman 
rejected this recommendation and the report of the working group for the second cycle noted that all 
its reservations were still in place. However, a similar recommendation was accepted by Mauritania in 
respect of its own impermissible reservations and by the second cycle Mauritania’s country report 
noted that they had withdrawn their impermissible reservations, replacing them with more focused 
reservations.
103
 Article 28(2) of CEDAW clearly states that a reservation considered ‘incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted’. 104  Therefore a 
recommendation requesting a state withdraw an impermissible reservation refers to an existing legal 
obligation upon the state under review that it is not fulfilling. The CEDAW Committee, which is 
responsible for enforcing the Convention, is the body with the legal responsible for enforcing the 
provisions of the treaty so resolutions on impermissible reservations are in effect duplicating its work. 
                                                          
96 Cowell and Milon (n 32).  
97 Bernaz (n 35) 91. 
98 CEDAW Committee, ‘Declarations, reservations, objections and notifications of withdrawal of reservations relating to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ (10 April 2006) CEDAW/SP/2006/2 10. 
99  Linda Keller, ‘The Impact of States Parties Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
Discrimination Against Women’ (2014) Michigan State Law Review 309.  
100 See Ryan Goodman, ‘Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent’ (2002) 96 American Journal of 
International Law 531, 537-538.  
101Catherine Redgwell, ‘Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights Committee General Comment No.24(52)’ (1997) 46 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 390, 391–392. 
102  UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Oman’ (24 March 2011) UN Doc  
A/HRC/17/7/Add.1 at 90.7, 90.15,90.16, and 90.30.  
103 UNHRC, ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 
16/21 Mauritania’ (6 August 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/23/MRT/1 at 1.52.  
104 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (opened for signature 17 December 1979, 
entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13, art 28(2). 
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Another example of this type of recommendation can be seen in Mexico’s recommendation to the 
Gambia to ‘decriminalize offences related to freedom of expression and guarantee that human rights 
defenders and journalists can carry out their work in an atmosphere of freedom and security’.105 This 
would require not only the repeal of laws constricting free speech but an ancillary obligation to 
provide specific protection for human rights defenders who would be more at risk from the general 
legal and political environment in the country. As Gambia is a state party to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its far-reaching laws constricting freedom of 
expression are not compatible with its obligations under article 19, part of this recommendation 
engages the fulfilment of its obligation under the ICCPR.
106
 
 
As noted, the HRC and General Assembly resolutions establishing the UPR described it as 
complementing the work of treaty bodies, not competing with them or duplicating their work as these 
recommendations appear to do. This type of recommendation is not interpreting an existing obligation 
or even creating a new obligation, rather it is attempting to elicit compliance with an existing 
obligation. Recommendations of this type are unlikely to be considered subsequent practice, which 
has a legal status in relation to treaty interpretation, as recommendations are offered bilaterally and 
their acceptance is decided on a case by cases basis by the state under review.
107
 The HRC is also not 
technically in the position of becoming a party to the treaty and is effectively enforcing it as a third 
party as human rights treaties reserve their membership to states.
108
 It is also not clear that the HRC or 
indeed any other UN body is bound by human rights treaties, or bound to enforce the rights contained 
within them.
109
  It is therefore difficult to give a comprehensive explanation of the relationship of 
these recommendations to treaty bodies.  
 
What the recommendations are doing, is acting as an enforcement mechanism for the obligation 
utilising the naming and shaming function of the UPR process to try and pressure the state under 
review to alter its behaviour. UPR recommendations on existing obligations are a mechanism for what 
Wiener calls ‘contestation’—the discursive practice of norm validation between states.110 By making a 
recommendation within the framework of the review process the lack of compliance with an existing 
obligation by the state under review is highlighted, forcing it to account for its non-compliance.  
Sometimes this can be of a procedural nature; for example Sierra Leone and Norway both made a 
recommendation in the first review cycle to Papua New Guinea that it should submit its overdue 
reports to a number of human rights treaty bodies including the Human Rights Committee and the 
CEDAW Committee.
111
 Lack of reporting is a form of non-compliance with human rights treaties that 
rely on state co-operation with country reporting to enhance the promotion and protection of human 
rights.
112
  
                                                          
105 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Gambia’ (24 December 2014) UN Doc 
A/HRC/28/6 at 109.146.  
106 On Gambia’s laws see Article 19, ‘Gambia: Article 19 individual submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review’ 
(Article 19, 15 March 2014) <https://www.article19.org/resources/gambia-article-19-individual-submission-un-universal-
periodic-review/> accessed 9 March 2018. 
107 This voluntary aspect of recommendations is crucial to the UPR process – see Sen (n 18) and Kevin Boyle ‘The United 
Nations Human Rights Council: Politics, Power and Human Rights’ (2009) 60 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 121. 
108 Christian Tomuschat, ‘International Organizations as Third Parties under the Law of International Treaties’ in Enzo 
Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (OUP, Oxford 2011) 206, 223. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Antje Wiener, ‘A Theory of Contestation – A Concise Summary of Its Argument and Concepts’ (2017) 49 Polity 109, 
112. 
111 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Papua New Guinea’ (11 July 2011) UN Doc 
A/HRC/18/18 at 78.9.  
112 This has the effect of functionally weakening treaty bodies see Niall Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human 
Rights Law: National Regional and International Jurisprudence (CUP, Cambridge 2002) 132–133. 
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Recommendations in these cases allow the UPR process to review a state over their adherence to a 
particular obligation and if accepted would allow subsequent review cycles to review the 
implementation of this recommendation. Elvira Domínguez Redondo’s explanation of what rejecting 
a recommendation entails implicitly supports this view on acceptance, arguing that rejection means 
that a state under review ‘is asserting its reluctance to be monitored by the UPR on the 
implementation of such a recommendation during its next review’.113 The obverse of this is that 
acceptance is recognition that the UPR has a role in monitoring the adherence of that obligation. This 
would notionally apply to any category five recommendation but, what differentiates these 
recommendations is that they directly refer to an existing legal obligation on the state, so what the 
state is consenting to is a form of enforcement mechanism. This is not entirely dissimilar to 
mechanisms in private international law that allow individuals to choose which mechanism of 
enforcement they wish to adopt or potentially chose multiple different mechanisms for the 
enforcement of an obligation.
114
 In these situations the legal obligation is not created by the 
enforcement mechanism but rather the enforcement mechanism has a legal role in enforcing the 
existing obligation. The model of enforcement used by the UPR is what Andrew Guzman terms a 
‘reputation cost’ model in that it tries to disincentive states from retreating from their obligations by 
highlighting non-norm compliant states as unsuitable or unreliable in the context of future 
international acts.
115
 Oona Hathaway notes in relation to human rights treaties that a major incentive 
behind states joining treaties were collateral consequences which lie outside the legal structure of the 
treaty and arise from interactions with other states in relation to that treaty. One of these collateral 
consequences, Hathaway argues, is the desire to signal an ‘intention to become good international 
citizens’ by committing to a human rights treaty which can act as a spur to subsequent compliance.116 
The very public and ritualised process of a UPR review not only highlights states which are 
complying with their international obligations—and therefore enhances the positive collateral 
consequences for them–but also highlights those that are not complying with their obligations, with 
the review process intensifying negative collateral consequences.  
 
The consent doctrine is relevant here as what the state is consenting to is having the UPR act as an 
enforcement mechanism for their existing legal obligations. However, this means that significant 
power is placed in the hands of the state under review to decide which obligations are subject to 
additional levels of enforcement. As Heather Collister notes, states are already able to amend the 
content of recommendations within the working group, leading to some issues not coming up in the 
review process and some states rejecting recommendations relating to instruments to which they are a 
party.
117
 For example Chile rejected Sweden’s recommendation that its ‘abortion laws are brought 
into line with Chile’s human rights obligations’ under the ICCPR.118 As Collister concludes this is a 
consequence of the ‘central role given state under review’119 in order to encourage co-operation with 
                                                          
113 Elvira Domínguez-Redondo, ‘The Universal Periodic Review–Is There Life Beyond Naming and Shaming in Human 
Rights Implementation?’ (2012) 4 New Zealand Law Review 673, 703. 
114  For a background see Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International 
Organizations (CUP, Cambridge 2005) chs 8 and 13; Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (OUP, Oxford 
2008) 16–20.  
115 Andrew Guzman, ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law’ (202) 90 California Law Review 1823. 
116 Oona Hathaway, ‘Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?’ (2007) 51 Journal of Conflict Resolution 588, 
597. 
117 Heather Collister, ‘Rituals and Implementation in the Universal Periodic Review and the Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ in 
Charlesworth and Larking (n 52) 109.  
118 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Chile’ (4 June 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/12/10 
para 24.   
119 Collister (n 117) 116.   
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the [review] process. Yet this comes at the cost of ‘a very mixed bag of recommendations’ some of 
which are openly ‘contradictory to a [state under review’s] obligations under international human 
rights law’. 120  Accepted recommendations whilst allowing the UPR process to act as a parallel 
enforcement mechanism also have their limitations, as they are heavily controlled by states.  
6 CONCLUSION 
While it is premature to think of the UPR as a law-making process, and states did not intend it to 
perform such a function when it was created, it is not entirely adequate to think of recommendations 
as simple declaratory statements with only political importance. The interactional account of 
international obligation, as presented by Brunnée and Toope, shows how legal obligations can emerge 
from international practices. UPR recommendations are having some impact on the protection of 
international human rights. By facilitating a process of contestation through the review process, the 
UPR provides a mechanism to alter state behaviour. Therefore, whilst it is incorrect to describe the 
UPR as a law-making process, some recommendations can have a legal status as a result of the 
interactional nature of the review process. As outlined in the third and fourth sections of this article, 
an individual recommendation can have a role in acting as an enforcement mechanism for existing 
legal obligations, or a series of recommendations can show the emergence of new interpretations of 
existing human rights norms. In practice, this means that those recommendations have a legal status as 
they play a role in the broader protection of human rights in international law.  
 
Scholars of international organisations have argued that the potential of organisations to evolve and 
define their powers means that they can create new sources of obligation.
121
 International 
organisations are inherently political and seek to use frameworks of legality to pursue their aims, 
framing a variety of decisions in legal language.
122
 Over time such declarations or decisions can 
evolve into a set of obligations in a way that the distinction between soft and hard law often fails to 
capture. The UPR was not designed to issue recommendations containing or creating legal 
obligations, but the way that the HRC’s predecessor—the UN Commission on Human Rights—
evolved institutionally, to encompass what effectively amounted to a system of individual petition, 
provides an example of how organisational competences are not fixed and are subject to a process of 
evolution.
123
 One merit of the UPR is that the process of issuing recommendations remains inherently 
political; states choose the subject area and the form of recommendations and are not subject to bloc 
voting or any other feature of international organisations that magnifies existing power imbalances 
within international law. Thus, if new norms emerge through the process of issuing recommendations, 
it represents a genuine and observable consensus among states as to the importance and status of a 
particular norm. This represents a significant democratisation of the process of norm creation in 
international human rights law, enhancing the UPR’s stated mission of promoting equality between 
states. It should be noted however that this raises some broader questions—such as how many 
accepted recommendations might be considered evidence of opinio juris—to which it is difficult to 
provide a concrete answer.   
 
                                                          
120 Ibid. 
121 See for example Jose Alvarez, ‘International Organizations: Then and Now’ (2006) American Journal of International 
Law 324, 328. 
122 For this argument see Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal, 
‘The concept of legalization’ (2000) 54 International Organization 401. 
123 See Howard Tolley, ‘The Concealed Crack in the Citadel: The United Nations Commission on Human Rights’ Response 
to Confidential Communications’ (1984) 6 Human Right Quarterly 420. 
 18 
This also poses problems, since the more legalised the process of recommendations becomes, the 
more a state might alter its behaviour during the process, potentially affecting other elements of the 
review. This might manifest itself in their responses in the interactive dialogue. The capacity to follow 
up on the implementation of previous accepted recommendations was intended to enhance the overall 
power of the UPR process, but may also encourage states to indulge in various tactics to impede the 
process. This could include forming alliances with other states to offer friendly or praise-bargained 
recommendations, which as Roger Blackman notes is already a feature of some states’ behaviour.124 
Whether this pattern of state behaviour emerges over the third or fourth review cycle is yet to be seen. 
 
It is a general demonstration of the way that the UPR process has evolved and been shaped by a 
multitude of different factors that it now has a framework for engaging in what effectively amounts to 
scrutiny of a state’s human rights commitments made in previous reviews. The operation of this 
function of the UPR in relation to human rights treaty commitments as described in section four 
creates a legalistic role for the UPR process, going significantly beyond the role its founders intended. 
The UPR was intended to be guided by interactional dialogue between states under review and their 
prospective peers, a process that was in essence political rather than legal. But the practice of the UPR 
and the HRC’s understandable desire to ensure that human rights are better enforced means that it has 
evolved beyond what was originally envisaged in its creation. Similarly, the legal status of certain 
recommendations is in many ways another manifestation of the broader evolution of the UPR.  
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